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Our interest in Bretton Woods lies in seeking to identify the nature of 
contemporary deliberation in the British Parliament relative to the 
proposed post-war monetary and financial organizations. Britain is the 
focus of the study because along with the United States, it was the main 
designer of the Bretton Woods system, starting with the so-called Keynes 
and White Plans, which formed the basis for negotiations for each 
country. [See document Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for an 
International Stabilization Fund for the United and Associated Nations 
(July 10, 1943)] 
 
The US, as the foremost creditor among the wartime allies, and Britain, 
whose debt to the rest of the world had increased during the war both 
substantially and rapidly, played out their designated roles in a way which 
reflected their respective global positions. But British acceptance of 
Bretton Woods was fraught with difficulties, for the terms of the 
agreement were a stark and formal indication of British decline. From at 
least 1942 onwards, it was clear to many observers that though Britain 
would emerge from the war victorious, she would also be depleted of 
resources, financially prostrate, with her colonial Empire in disarray, and 
highly-dependent on the benevolence of wartime allies, most notably the 
United States. 
 
Prior to Bretton Woods, the international monetary system had evolved 
incrementally and at times accidentally. All previous efforts to modify by 
design had failed. A change of this magnitude inevitably required the US 
to engage internationally, which it had not done in the institutional 
structure created after the First World War, and for Britain to overcome 
its historical and ideological attachment to Empire. As a means of 
understanding this engagement by Britain and the US, we examine the 
debates in the British Parliament between 1943 and 1945 in order to 
understand how Britain came to accept Bretton Woods when there were 
so many ideological obstacles to such acceptance.  
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We interpret the parliamentary debates by reference to Britain’s financial 
position, and the British party system. The latter was not unimportant for 
while a Conservative-led coalition government was in power for most of 
the war, between May 1940 and May 1945, it was succeeded for two 
months by an interim ‘Caretaker Government’ pending the result of the 
1945 election. This Ministry was then succeeded by the first majority 
Labour government, whose peacetime socialist agenda, propelled by a 
huge victory at the polls, was different to the approach of the wartime 
Ministry. Thus, while monetary and financial negotiations were ongoing 
throughout the period, and there was a select cadre of officials who had 
come to the fore in wartime, there was a degree of discontinuity in 
government as well as the more pronounced economic dislocation.1 
 
Throughout the negotiations leading to the Bretton Woods agreement, it 
was fully apparent that any international agreement would involve 
striking a balance between establishing, on the one hand, multinational 
and multilateral rules and institutions, and on the other hand, maintaining 
nation-state discretion in the post-war international system.2 At Bretton 
Woods, there was a tension involving the rights of nations to revise their 
exchange-rates without International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement. 
Determining boundaries and rules, and appropriate multilateral 
institutional structures, involved the thorny issue of agreeing limits to 
national sovereignty in shaping domestic policies, with the tension 
between international adjustment needs and domestic political 
requirements forming a central dilemma of international monetary 
relations. 
 
Important to understanding Bretton Woods are two roles that the 
institutions created there would fulfil. First was the role of an international 
reserve currency and its part as a credible anchor for domestic monetary 
policy. The two principal architects of Bretton Woods, John Maynard 
Keynes and Harry White, began the process by outlining plans for the 
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post-war system from respectively British and American positions. The 
Keynes Plan envisaged a supra-national currency, whereas the White Plan 
had the dollar playing the anchor role though formally tied to gold.  
 
Second was the role of an institution to solve international collective 
action problems and thus achieve adjustment of national imbalances 
which were misaligned with fixed exchange-rates, and whether this action 
was to be symmetric or asymmetric, and thus on all countries or just 
debtors, and to prevent competitive currency devaluations as well as 
tariffs.3 Such a system required limiting national discretion in 
macroeconomic policymaking, and giving force to this constraint required 
an enhanced role for national governments operating through 
international institutions. The international monetary system as it had 
evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth century, had meant that national 
governments, by linking their currencies to gold, were de facto linking 
their currencies to each other. While providing a kind of spontaneous 
order to the international monetary system, ultimately, the system had 
proved to be too much of a constraint.4  
 
Keynes and White acknowledged that the gold standard had proved 
excessively rigid, as had been painfully evident in the inter-war period 
when nations had been required to impose domestic recessions to 
maintain the international standard. International macro-economic policy 
was led more by central banks than national governments, but had failed 
to provide a stable institutional framework. With the benefit of hindsight, 
this was a failure in the conception of central bank independence—that is, 
central banks not operating under transparently delegated parliamentary 
authority with clear objectives set in national statute. Beyond this 
observation on the appropriate setting for central bank independence, 
tackling international macro-economic policymaking required an 
institution that embodied the authority of national governments alongside 
the remit of central banks.5  
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A further important change was to require a clearer, but by no means 
absolute, separation of public and private interests in financing external 
government deficits. The inter-war system had depended largely on 
private, mainly New York banks, providing lending facilities to debtor 
governments. These same banks stood accused of benefitting from 
currency speculation alongside debtor government financing. Bretton 
Woods therefore sought to separate a public good function from a private 
good. It was therefore viewed by the New York banks as challenging their 
interests, specifically by allowing capital controls between nations, and 
by promoting the IMF as substitute lender to indebted nations. In doing 
so, it was considered a radical departure from sound banking principles, 
in giving debtors a voice in determining the policies of creditors.6  
 
While these features represented the broad prospective financial 
architecture, the evolution of the respective plans and the progress of the 
war led to heightened debate on the post-war monetary and international 
order which was inseparable from the growing awareness of changes in 
global politics and leadership. 
 
The 1943 debate: The White and Keynes Plans 
  
Amidst increasing wartime cooperation between Britain and the US, plans 
for the post-war financial world were advanced in the respective countries 
with the White and Keynes plans. [See document Preliminary Draft 
Outline of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund for the 
United and Associated Nations (July 10, 1943) and Proposals for an 
International Clearing Union (April 1943)] In 1943, Parliament debated 
the Keynes Plan, in the following year it debated a White Paper 
summarising the “combined” White and Keynes Plans (which formed the 
basis of the Bretton Woods conference), and in 1945 debated and accepted 
the agreement. Across these years, the circumstances were very different.7 
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The debates in 1943 and 1944, in considering post-war plans, took place 
while the war was continuing. They were therefore aspirational and 
somewhat removed from the reality of the post-war world. In contrast, the 
1945 debates were precisely focused on approving a Bill to put in place 
the necessary technicalities for Britain to approve the Bretton Woods 
agreement and join the new institutions.8  
 
As previously stated, the question of national discretion in economic 
policymaking was at the heart of the economic issues surrounding the 
debates. For Britain, this assumed the form of whether Bretton Woods 
could impose domestic deflation as the inter-war gold standard had, and 
whether it would limit or end Britain’s development of imperial trade 
preference and the sterling area. The concern with national interests and 
economic and political freedom informed the legislative scrutiny and 
debate in Britain, and these concerns were framed within the context of 
the financial crisis enveloping the country at the end of the war, but which 
had been apparent much earlier. The post-war world was going to be a 
very difficult place for Britain, and politicians of all parties were aware of 
it.  
 
In May 1943, the respective plans of Keynes and White for post-war 
international monetary reform were debated in Parliament. The schemes 
were presented “as a basis for discussion, criticism and constructive 
amendment.”9 [See document Proposals for an International Clearing 
Union (April 1943)] At this stage, debate primarily concerned seeking 
approval for new monetary institutions and mechanisms facilitating 
international trade and full employment. In his 1930 Treatise on Money, 
Keynes had projected the idea of a “Super-national Bank-Money” issued 
by a Super-national bank which would supplant gold as the ultimate 
reserve asset. Keynes refurbished this idea in the 1940s, naming the 
currency “bancor” with the aim not just of supplanting gold but of 
preventing the global hegemony of the dollar.10  
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Keynes defined his plan’s broad purpose as to “provide that money earned 
by selling goods to one country can be spent on purchasing the products 
of any other country.”11 Awareness that Britain would be highly-indebted 
after the war led to praise for Keynes’ requirement that creditor countries 
should restore trade imbalances by accepting payment in goods and not 
merely in specie. The US plan was notably silent on creditor nations, and 
a few speakers argued that global trade could not recover by placing the 
onus on debtors.12 The White Plan, as it developed and became the 
blueprint for Bretton Woods, made the dollar, backed by gold, the 
dominant post-war currency, which White viewed as essential for the 
success of the proposed institutions. [See document Preliminary Draft 
Outline of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund for the 
United and Associated Nations (July 10, 1943)] Another view of US 
motives, often associated with Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
involved the US intentionally acting as benevolent guide, in the sense that 
what would be good for the US would be good for the rest of the world—
an attitude redolent of nineteenth-century British free trade imperialism. 
A further element in the US approach to negotiations was the “Congress 
won’t agree” position when resisting unpalatable proposals. Keynes 
himself perhaps underestimated the legitimacy of Congressional and 
popular resistance to his plan, often described as a “credit scheme,” the 
bill for which Congress was unlikely to accept.13 
 
The configuration of national interests explains why the Keynes Plan 
involved the IMF being able to impose symmetric adjustment 
responsibilities for deficit and surplus nations whereas in White’s Plan 
(the eventual outcome), the adjustment fell on debtor nations. The US 
objection to the Keynes Plan was that it involved too much discipline 
falling on the US as the creditor nation, as well as exposing the US to 
almost unlimited extensions of credit to other countries—on this issue the 
US strongly played the Congressional objection card. Thus, the White 
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Plan envisaged a smaller IMF in terms of balance-sheet capacity, with 
more constraints on nations using it, and preserving gold standard-type 
discipline but adding the modern concept of required economic 
adjustment or conditionality for IMF lending. [See documents Proposals 
for an International Clearing Union (April 1943) and Preliminary Draft 
Outline of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund for the 
United and Associated Nations (July 10, 1943)] 
 
Both plans had grown out of the same intellectual climate and possessed 
an identical purpose, in establishing new global monetary institutions 
aimed at exchange-rate stability.14 White’s fund would bring about a 
world congenial to American economic interests, where US exports 
would be protected by the commitment of other countries not to raise 
tariffs or engage in competitive devaluation—stipulations underpinned by 
Fund penalties. Keynes insisted on a system that left more discretion to 
national policy-making, but his clearing bank incorporated corrective 
action on balance of payments by debtors and creditors. British concern 
with creditor obligations led to suggestions that the US should reduce their 
credit balances, in the interest of pursuing a genuinely multilateral system, 
and the US appeared to comply, with a scarce currency clause allowing 
debtor countries to limit imports from persistent creditor countries. Under 
White’s plan, a creditor country’s currency could become scarce owing to 
fixed exchange-rates and by demand exceeding supply. However, it was 
not long before White reneged by implying the burden of adjustment lay 
with debtors.  
 
At this early stage, British aims were defensive: to seek the survival of as 
much of the pre-war imperial preference system as possible, and to create 
a post-war system with some measure of protection from a sudden outflow 
of cash, and to prevent exporters being outcompeted by overseas rivals. 
Britain was opposed to the presumed effect of the White Plan that the IMF 
could prevent a country devaluing its exchange-rate. These defensive 
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aims were reflected in the parliamentary debate on the plans, with support 
being cautious and lukewarm and opposition or concern being forthright 
and stridently expressed. Government support for Keynes was signaled 
by the Chancellor, Kingsley Wood, who contrasted the Clearing Union 
proposal and the attempt at international financial organization with the 
economic instability and political extremism of the inter-war period.15 
Further government support came from Ralph Assheton, Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, who sought to allay fears of the magnitude of 
the proposed changes by stating: 
 
The essence of the plan is that no change should be made in the 
exchange rate between countries except under well-defined conditions 
... the marriage with gold, so far as the British plan is concerned, is 
more in the nature of a companionate marriage than an indissoluble 
union.16 
 
Further support came from Conservatives such as Henry Brooke, who 
welcomed further discussion on monetary planning without committing 
to specific measures. While these sentiments were the main tenor of the 
debate, unanimity was unlikely, and anticipating his opposition to the 
final Bretton Woods agreement, the Conservative MP Robert Boothby 
considered the White Plan a return to the Gold Standard, accompanied 
by a cycle of falling prices, profits, and purchasing power, with 
competitive tariffs, subsidies, and devaluation.17 At this stage, Boothby 
was positive towards the expansionist effects of the Keynes plan but 
warned there must be no compromise on full convertibility or 
interference with the right to impose exchange restrictions. Boothby was 
uncompromising:  
If we do this again, it will be the end. The end of all our hopes of an 
expansionist policy, and of social advance. It will be the end of the 
Beveridge plan, of improved education, of housing reconstruction, the 
10 
 
end of the new Britain that we are fighting to rebuild. It will lead once 
again to world depression, to chaos, and, ultimately, to war.18 
Comparing the merits of the two plans, Sir A. Lambert-Ward 
(Conservative) saw fundamental differences, most pertinently the role of 
gold in the US plan. The accumulation and hoarding of gold indicated that 
the US “do not appear to have realized the responsibility which attaches 
to a creditor nation.” Frederick Pethick-Lawrence (Labour) saw more 
rigidity in the American plan, which was “in fact a full return to the gold 
standard” and appeared to ignore the lesson that “shackles of gold” had 
damaged international trade in the inter-war period but he thought the 
British scheme was more expansionist compared to the deflationary 
aspects of the American plan.19 Despite concerns and criticisms, plans 
continued apace for further discussion on the shape of the post-war 
monetary world.   
 
Negotiations on the Keynes and White plans 
Negotiations for a Joint Statement between the US and the UK took place 
in Washington between 15 September and 9 October 1943. Though the 
British government had supported the proposals made by Keynes, by late 
1943 the government had abandoned hope of the Clearing Union being 
accepted by the US but now “sought to secure changes in the White plan 
that they believed were essential for Britain’s welfare and for acceptance 
by the British Parliament.”20  
For the duration of the war, Churchill had little to say about monetary and 
economic issues but trusted the judgement and expertise of the legion of 
economic advisers now attached to the government. Keynes was brought 
into the Treasury as a Special Adviser in 1940, and many academic 
economists, especially in the Economic Section, were closely associated 
with Keynes in Anglo-American and international negotiations and in 
post-war planning.21 Lionel Robbins recounted how the Americans 
appreciated the size of the British delegation, as an indication of how 
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seriously Britain was taking the talks. Robbins recorded how domestic 
political considerations had influenced discussions, for the experience of 
1925 and the over-valuation wrought by the Gold Standard “had so burnt 
itself into the memory of the public that it was safe to say that no British 
government could commit itself to a settlement which ever appeared to 
involve inflexibility. The Americans seemed to be impressed by this.”22  
With sufficient modifications between the schemes, Robbins remained 
convinced a settlement could be reached, and British optimism was 
buttressed by recognition of a clear shift in US policy from bilateralism to 
multilateralism by 1943. Both Britain and the US had reached the same 
conclusion, that the world needed a multi-lateral trading system, tariff 
reductions, and multi-lateral inclusion and input into the design and 
operation of the system’s rules and guidelines facilitated by an 
international financial organization.23 
 
The 1944 Debate: The Plan for Bretton Woods 
 
Before the Bretton Woods proceedings, Lionel Robbins recorded how the 
New York Times launched “an almost continuous barrage of hostile and, 
for the most part, ignorant criticism” of the prospective arrangements.24 
Much of the disagreement at Bretton Woods between the two countries 
was framed by the US desire to reform the pre-war international system 
while assuring US control, which effectively limited the discretion of 
other nations. While accepting the need for change, Britain’s immediate 
desire was to secure a path of adjustment that did not destabilise the 
British economy, and which preserved some national discretion for 
exchange-rate adjustment. We can aptly characterize US objectives as 
seeking to impose macro-economic adjustment obligations onto debtor 
and not creditor nations while limiting the scope for national discretion on 
exchange-rate revaluation by empowering the IMF, in which there was a 
built-in US veto.25 British objectives were constrained by the immediate 
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need to deal with its difficult post-war legacy, while favouring an 
international system with more symmetric adjustment by debtors and 
creditors, consistent with Britain’s new position as a net debtor.  
 
Above all, Britain sought a reduction of the wartime national debt to the 
US, and the means to set its own terms in resolving the problem of sterling 
balances. Those objectives required tariffs and capital controls, ostensibly 
to enable the British economy to adjust, with the intention that balances 
should be used only to buy British goods.26 Britain had purchased goods 
to support the war effort from countries within the sterling area (broadly 
but not exactly Commonwealth countries) paying for goods in sterling. 
Consequent of exchange controls in the sterling area, balances were not 
convertible into other currencies, thus creating significant short-term 
indebtedness for Britain which persisted after the war. While mobilising 
the economic resources of the Commonwealth countries to support the 
war effort, it left liabilities far exceeding British gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, and led to the continuation of capital controls, 
notwithstanding the objective of Bretton Woods to end controls and 
establish currency convertibility.  
Rejecting the idea of alternative financing, in the form of a loan from 
private New York bankers, Keynes continued dealing with Morgenthau 
and White, in the hope of blending the Keynes and White plans.27 The 
result was the “Joint Statement by Experts of United and Associated 
Nations in the Establishment of an International Stabilization Fund”. [See 
document Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an 
International Monetary Fund (April 1944)] The Joint Statement was only 
an agreement of principles by technical experts and not approved by 
national governments. The British government was in no way committed 
to the IMF, and Parliament only considered the Statement as “a suitable 
foundation for further international consultation with a view to improved 
monetary co-operation after the war.”28 The plans provided for 
establishing and maintaining exchange-rate stability based on free 
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convertibility, while proposing an orderly process for exchange-rate 
adjustment. Moreover, the external value of the domestic currency would 
conform to the internal value, not the reverse, leaving countries in full 
control of domestic monetary policy.  
At a War Cabinet meeting on 17 December 1943, Herbert Morrison, along 
with other Labour Ministers, did not allow fond imperial sentiment to 
cloud his judgment, in stating: 
On sentimental grounds we should all of us favour Empire Trade. But 
this country could not live solely on it, nor could the Dominions live 
on trade merely with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions.29  
Divided counsels became more apparent on 23 February 1944, with Hugh 
Dalton recording Lord Beaverbrook’s opinion that “We are giving up our 
economic Empire.”30 The winter of 1943-4 had seen a combined effort 
between Bank of England officials and Beaverbrook to thwart moves 
towards a liberal, international order. Keynes castigated what he saw as 
old arrangements and old-fashioned ideas, and informed Beaverbrook “it 
is only under the aegis of an international scheme that we can hope to 
preserve the sterling area” though it remained unclear whether a genuinely 
multilateral system could coexist alongside imperial preference.31 
 
In the Commons debate of May 1944, Left and Right attacked the notion 
of non-reciprocal trade, that is, where preferences, typically lower tariffs 
on imports from developing countries, were given to particular countries. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir John Anderson denied there was 
anything in the monetary plan prohibiting reciprocal commercial 
agreements. A key issue was whether countries in balance of payments 
disequilibrium could restore their position through the system’s 
mechanism. Keynes argued the plan placed an appropriate share of 
responsibility for adjustment on creditor countries, and not over-reliance 
on debtors as the gold standard had.32 [See document Speech by Lord 
Keynes on the International Monetary Fund debate, House of Lords (May 
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23, 1944)] The survival of imperial preference and the sterling area were 
a concern for many MPs but Anderson pre-empted Keynes in stating there 
was “nothing in the proposed scheme to preclude continuance of sterling 
area arrangements.”33 [See document Speech by Lord Keynes on the 
International Monetary Fund debate, House of Lords (May 23, 1944)] 
Moreover, free convertibility of sterling within an international system 
was deemed necessary for Britain to maintain imperial preference, 
otherwise, Commonwealth countries would realize they were better off in 
another arrangement. Yet many peers and MPs voiced concern over the 
uncertainty of the future arrangements and the survival of Britain’s 
monetary infrastructure.34  
 
In debating the proposed new monetary institutions, specifically the IMF, 
allusions to past mistakes of central banks in the interwar period surfaced. 
However, Keynes stressed the primacy of national sovereignty and 
political authority, in describing the IMF as “an organisation between 
Governments, in which Central Banks only appear as the instrument and 
agent of their Government.” [See document Speech by Lord Keynes on 
the International Monetary Fund debate, House of Lords (May 23, 1944)]  
For many members, protecting Britain’s “vital interests” was a paramount 
consideration, and the sense of dictation a concern and a blow to national 
prestige and pride. Trying to assuage these fears, Viscount Simon, the 
Lord Chancellor, despite acknowledging that achieving approximately 
equal voting strength to the US was important, argued that the new body 
was “a forum for consultation” which could not “impose its will on every 
country.”35  
 
The debates drew on the contrast between the flawed inter-war gold 
standard whereby the US had stockpiled gold, the result of her trading 
surplus, and the classical nineteenth century gold standard whereby 
Britain recycled her trade surplus into productive overseas investment 
rather than gold stockpiling. In the Commons, Pethick-Lawrence, Leader 
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of the Opposition to the Coalition Government, thought the scheme went 
some way towards returning to a “gold basis” though not the historical 
Gold Standard. The Liberal MP Graham White supported the proposal 
and held that the US realized that the days of isolationism were over, and 
that they would co-operate for the sake of global prosperity. However, 
pessimism over US intentions and objectives were not hard to find, with 
the socialist Emanuel Shinwell arguing there was not the “remotest 
prospect” of the US reducing tariffs to allow British goods to enter the 
market. In another vein, the Liberal MP, George Schuster, doubted tariff 
reductions would lead to a great increase in imports because the economic 
position of the two countries was not complementary. Richard Stokes, an 
independent-minded Labour MP, argued that the scheme was “a cunning 
way of re-introducing into the European monetary system the hoards of 
gold at present locked in America.” Predictably, Boothby, a persistent 
critic of international monetary organization, argued there was no 
assurance that the US intended to pursue a policy of deliberate expansion 
in the post-war world.36  
 
In the Lords, Keynes made a robust case that there must be no return to 
the 1930s, when the huge trade surplus of the US led to stockpiling gold 
as the countervailing asset on its capital account. [See document Speech 
by Lord Keynes on the International Monetary Fund debate, House of 
Lords (May 23, 1944)] He found substantial support across the political 
spectrum. Referring to Keynes’ long-standing opposition to the gold 
standard, the Conservative Lord Melchett argued Keynes “has spent a 
lifetime fighting the restrictive effects of the gold standard, and it is quite 
amazing to hear people coming forward at this stage to accuse him of 
trying to tie us to the gold standard system.” Another Conservative, Lord 
Balfour of Burleigh, stated that Keynes had proved the new arrangements 
did not anchor Britain’s economy “to other people’s conditions through 
the medium of gold” but provided for domestic adjustment, thus retaining 
economic sovereignty. Viscount Simon (Liberal), reflecting the 
16 
 
Government position, viewed gold as a convenient “measuring stick” for 
the “comparative relations of currencies” and “nothing to do with going 
back to the gold standard or anything of that kind.”37     
 
The parliamentary exchanges of 1944 reveal that few were ready to accept 
the full implications of Britain’s decline. To cushion the effects of change 
it was anticipated that the proposed transition period would be lengthy, 
with some continuation of Lend-Lease to avoid dislocation, something 
some speakers mistakenly assumed the US would feel obliged to do as 
recompense for Britain’s wartime sacrifices.38 Keynes’ supra-national 
reserve currency idea had been jettisoned and the dollar assumed the role 
of anchor currency tied to gold. While currencies would set their value 
against the dollar and gold, Keynes stipulated this relationship merely 
expressed the relative value of currencies, not a return to a gold standard. 
[See document Speech by Lord Keynes on the International Monetary 
Fund debate, House of Lords (May 23, 1944)] As we have seen, most 
speakers, while acknowledging superficial similarities, recognized the 
substantive differences.39  
 
Overall, the tone of the 1944 debates was one of slight pessimism and 
considerable uncertainty, though, with a few exceptions, criticism was 
primarily focused on the absence of specificity.40 Party divisions were 
largely though not completely blurred in debate by wartime 
bipartisanship, for normal party politics was suspended for the duration of 
the Coalition Government between 1940 and 1945. Nevertheless, there 
were grounds for criticism and anxiety, primarily over IMF powers, the 
survival of the sterling area and imperial preference, and fears of a return 
to a gold standard. Yet hope remained that the new international system 
would be underpinned by symmetrical adjustment between creditors and 
debtors, and that domestic policy would not be constrained by the IMF. 
 
The 1945 parliamentary debates: the Bretton Woods agreements  
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Several points are relevant to understanding the 1945 debates. Firstly, 
they were not solely, or even mainly, focused on Bretton Woods. They 
also covered the end of Lend-Lease, and conditions for a US loan 
designed to sustain a faster transition to the new international system than 
envisaged in 1944. Accepting the loan and faster transition was a 
condition placed on Britain by the new Truman Administration. Secondly, 
the 1945 debates did not concern the design of Bretton Woods and 
whether it could be amended, and there was dissent at the circumscription 
of the role of Parliament. Thirdly, the debates also involved a request from 
the government to approve a negotiating position in a future international 
trade conference as part of the post-war shift towards international 
cooperation. The 1944 debates had been somewhat nebulous for it was 
unclear what the specific proposals would be, when the war would end, 
and which countries would participate in the post-war financial 
institutions. The more informed sessions of 1945 were based on the 
greater clarity and substance of the Bretton Woods agreement which had 
superseded the aspirations of the 1944 Joint Statement. [See document 
Final Act (Text)] 
 
The US and Britain held fundamentally differing conceptions of the scope 
and nature of the IMF—reflecting their relative positions as debtor and 
creditor nations. Commensurate with debtor nation status, Britain stressed 
national discretion, especially in adjusting exchange-rates, a longer 
transition period, and while seeking a larger Fund, was unhappy with the 
proposed national quota formula. As dominant creditor nation, the US 
held an almost diametrically-opposed position, emphasizing exchange-
rate stability, promoting the powers of a smaller Fund with a short 
transition period, and with no change in the proposed quotas for 
borrowing capacity and voting power.41  
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In the event, the IMF agreement on July 22, 1944, formalized the shift 
towards the dollar becoming the dominant currency with a link to gold. 
White argued that the Fund’s special purpose was to prevent competitive 
devaluation of currencies, but the 10% devaluation permitted by the so-
called “exchange clause” was accepted. Sterling was to be freely 
convertible after five years when, as a founder member of the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Britain 
would fully abide by IMF rules. [See documents Articles of Agreement 
of the International Monetary Fund (July 22, 1944) and Articles of 
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (July 22, 1944)] 
 
After Bretton Woods, moves were made towards formal ratification of the 
agreements. In the policy document “Overseas Financial Policy in Stage 
III”, of March 1945, and circulated to Cabinet on 15 May, Keynes had 
warned of the high external debt, weakened export industries, and bloated 
overseas expenditure that Britain was now burdened with. Keynes starkly 
outlined Britain’s choices and famously considered the views of economic 
nationalists and imperialists, and their advocacy of autarky and bi-lateral 
trade agreements, and opposition to an American loan, as leading to 
extreme austerity and “Starvation Corner” for Britain. The bleak 
economic position was exemplified at the end of the war, with Britain 
having lost one-quarter of her wealth, with sterling debts of $14 billion, 
and her volume of exports reduced by 54% between 1938 and 1945.42  
In August 1945, the US terminated Lend-Lease. With its end, underlying 
tensions in Anglo-American relations surfaced, with both sides 
contending with domestic interests resistant to any agreement. There had 
been a change of government in Britain, with the Labour party coming to 
power in July. In the US, the new Truman Administration appeared hostile 
to favourable deals, not least because of suspicions surrounding the 
financial prudence of a socialist government.43 After the 1945 election 
victory, the composition of the Labour party and the extent of its 
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parliamentary majority, became a crucial element in ratifying Bretton 
Woods. In the 1930s, Labour’s economic policy had been based on a 
planned domestic economy alongside a foreign policy component termed 
“international planning.” By 1945 this rather vague concept was rejected, 
replaced by a “theological maze” surrounding how to align subscription 
to a liberal international economic order with a domestic economy based 
on socialist planning.44 It appeared contradictory to aim at controlling 
most aspects of one’s own national economy while trying to abolish 
“economic nationalism” in the world.  
During the war, international economic issues had been discussed to an 
unprecedented degree. Labour ministers had been privy to Cabinet 
discussions on international affairs, and had access to expert advice. 
Labour economists and politicians, including Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas 
Jay, and Evan Durbin laid particular emphasis on extensive planning in 
the post-war world, and by 1943, many of them held government posts.45 
Labour was not primarily Atlanticist, and its somewhat paradoxical 
behaviour after taking office in 1945 can be explained by the 
exceptionally tough conditions the government faced and the fundamental 
contradiction of the “planning paradox” in reconciling its socialist 
aspirations towards domestic planning with international capitalist 
institutions.46 Labour’s commitment to Empire trading connections was 
also a difficult issue and Labour’s continued and undoubtedly genuine 
internationalist aspirations were called into question, not least by 
American opinion, and by the party’s defence of Britain’s preferential 
trade privileges. 
Britain’s dire financial position had forced her to seek financial assistance 
but negotiations in Washington in 1945 went badly, and Keynes, meeting 
American resistance to his calls for a grant reimbursement in recognition 
of wartime sacrifices, had to retreat. After proposals and counter-
proposals between the respective governments, including an American 
loan conditional on Britain dismantling imperial preference, making 
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sterling freely convertible, and cooperating with the US in establishing 
global free trade, Britain accepted a $3.75 billion loan at 2% interest, 
which represented a humiliation for Keynes, who also conceded free 
convertibility of sterling for current transactions one year after enactment 
of loan terms. The US argued that the loan changed Britain’s position and 
that the transition period, the five-year buffer for convertibility secured at 
Bretton Woods, should be adjusted accordingly.47 
 
There were further shocks. Attlee’s statement to Parliament on 6 
December was accompanied by details of the financial agreement and 
joint statements on the preliminary Anglo-American trade agreement and 
the Lend-Lease settlement. The US had warned that financial aid was 
conditional on Britain accepting Bretton Woods, and with ratification one 
of the few negotiating weapons Britain possessed, the new Chancellor, 
Dalton, tied the parliamentary passage of Bretton Woods to the “even 
more strongly disliked, but scarcely escapable” loan proposal.48 [See 
document Final Act (Text)] The loan was the keystone of the arch in 
Anglo-American relations for without it Parliament was unlikely to accept 
Bretton Woods. Equally, the British government was clearly not going to 
terminate the imperial preferential arrangements without recompense.49  
 
The Cabinet was sufficiently nervous of negative reaction as to allow very 
little parliamentary debate, and though the terms were not debatable by 
Parliament, the deadline for ratification, making Britain a founding 
member of the Fund and Bank, and for accepting the American loan, was 
31 December 1945. The 1945 debates were far less consensual than in 
1944. The early end of the war had produced a set of unusually 
unfavourable circumstances for Britain. Debate focused on three main 
areas: firstly, the loan terms; secondly, the IMF’s remit, terms of 
reference, and operational capability; and thirdly, the ramifications of new 
commercial arrangements. Additionally, there was disquiet over process, 
with members complaining Britain was being forced to hastily accept 
21 
 
unfavourable terms under duress without proper parliamentary debate and 
scrutiny.50  
 
Despite promoting the loan’s positive features, Keynes was ashamed of 
the interest charges, and his speech has been characterized as partly “an 
apology”, for he was angered by the unfavourable final terms which, 
reflecting the dominance of the White Plan, veered heavily towards US 
interests.51 Wartime sacrifices were not seen by the Americans as 
justification for special treatment, and Keynes’ argument that US 
negotiators stressed “future mutual advantage rather than past history” 
provoked fury among many MPs. Sir John Anderson called for a “clean 
slate” and the Labour MP Rhys Davies thought the terms very hard. Lord 
Woolton stated that he could accept Bretton Woods but not the loan. For 
the government, the loan was presented as a means of minimising 
austerity, a stance aimed at inducing loyalty among Labour MPs and 
peers, and one that was broadly accepted.52 
 
Voicing the deep disquiet which characterized the debate, the 
Conservative MP Oliver Stanley likened it to a “vanquished people 
discussing the economic penalties of defeat.”53 For the government, Sir 
Stafford Cripps described the agreements as “inter-dependent” and “not 
quite independent” of the loan. Many MPs were disturbed by this 
connection, and even leading Ministers possessed little enthusiasm for the 
loan. Dalton described it as “a strange and ironical reward” for Britain’s 
wartime efforts, and conceded that the agreements fell short of what 
Britain had hoped for. For Boothby, onerous loan terms were of a nature 
“never hitherto imposed on a nation that has not been defeated in war.” 
For Denis Kendall MP, the loan was a “very bad bargain” which would 
cost Britain her “economic liberty and the development of our Empire.”54 
Others argued Britain should have sought a loan from the Empire, or 
insisted that the US provide a loan with fewer punitive conditions but 
Cripps stated that other options had been carefully considered.55  
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Those supportive of the loan pointed to the proviso that Britain could 
cancel interest payments if exports in any year did not cover the pre-war 
level of imports adjusted for inflation, and if official reserves were 
inadequate to make payments. However, both opponents and abstainers 
questioned the value of this waiver clause because, on the assumption that 
trade levels would always be above pre-war rates, they argued the bar was 
set in the wrong place for it to be meaningful.56  
The Bretton Woods agreement provided greater scope for debating the 
shape of the post-war world. For its supporters, an optimistic view 
prevailed that the IMF provided a balance between national discretion in 
policy-making, and reasonable domestic freedom to adjust exchange-
rates, while securing financial advantages of international cooperation. 
Despite a linkage to gold, the system was not a return to the gold standard. 
By establishing multilateral trade based on exchange-rate stability it was 
hoped that competitive devaluation would be prevented. However, 
opponents held, in the event correctly, that the 10% permitted devaluation 
would be insufficient.  
The scarce currency clause provided that if the IMF had low stocks of a 
currency it could be deemed a “scarce currency”, and members would be 
entitled and expected to discriminate against that country’s goods by their 
commercial practices. Those supporting the clause claimed it allowed 
other countries to apply sanctions, like import restrictions, if the US 
pursued a mercantilist-type policy. Opponents argued the clause could not 
be invoked so long as the Fund could borrow dollars from the US, thus 
enabling the US to avoid changing its pattern of trade.57 They had little 
confidence that concessions made over scarce currency were not easily 
evaded, and the one-year conversion was considered too short an interval 
for a change of this magnitude, though voting power in the IMF, with 
Commonwealth votes at 25%, including 13% for Britain, almost matching 
the 27% for the US, provided some reassurance.58 It was widely expected 
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that after the war the dollar would become a scarce currency but owing to 
the Marshall Plan and other aid programmes, this did not in fact occur.  
 
The loan and Bretton Woods arrangements were conflated most often in 
relation to imperial preference and the sterling area. The proposal to make 
sterling convertible for current payments and terminate the wartime form 
of the sterling area was vigorously debated.59 Point 4 of the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter had stated the desire of the US and UK for open trading 
conditions, and Article VII of the 1941 Mutual Aid Agreement, 
anticipating pressure from the US for ending imperial preference, 
projected elimination of all forms of trade discrimination. This connection 
was known as “The Consideration” for American help with Lend-Lease.  
 
It was acknowledged as early as 1941 that, despite the insertion of the 
words “with due respect to their existing obligations” at the behest of the 
War Cabinet, such a course might conflict with the 1932 Ottawa 
Agreements. Visiting Washington in May-July 1941, Keynes, as principal 
adviser to the Chancellor, had acknowledged this could be a difficulty for 
Britain.60 The Ottawa Agreements had significantly strengthened and 
extended preferential tariffs throughout the British Empire, with fifteen 
bi-lateral preferential agreements made representing an extension of 
imperial preference at the expense of non-Empire countries, but divisions 
now arose over defending or even extending and strengthening imperial 
trade.  
 
In 1943, the future Conservative politician Enoch Powell viewed the 
United States, not Japan or Germany, as the real enemy of the British 
Empire.61 Roosevelt for his part deprecated past “artificial barriers created 
through senseless economic rivalries” and after the loan agreement, 
expectations ran high that the end of imperial preference was in sight.62 
Arguably, Churchill had not understood how costly American support 
would prove to be, for Lend-Lease was used by White and Morgenthau to 
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secure the “grand principle” of non-discriminatory, multilateral trade. 
Many MPs made the connection, broadly believing “loss of preferences 
was the price of the loan.”63 For the US, arguments for equal access to 
Britain’s export markets acquired more urgency from the accumulating 
sterling balances which blocked the conversion of pounds into dollars. 
Those balances had grown during the war. In 1940, Britain was 
dangerously short of dollars, and currency transactions by British 
residents were subject to exchange controls, with imports only permitted 
under license. Inhabitants of sterling area countries could use sterling 
accumulated from exports within the area, but as British exports declined, 
so the sterling balances, that is, British debts increased. By agreement, the 
dollars secured for exports were collated in London and drawn on only to 
pay for essential American exports. Regarding non-sterling countries, 
Britain negotiated agreements with neutrals in Europe and Latin America 
to pay for exports in “area pounds sterling” which could be used only for 
goods and services purchased within the sterling area. The overall effect 
was to keep the demand for American exports artificially low by blocking 
conversion of sterling into dollars and by controlling Dominion spending 
of directly earned dollars.64  
 
The evolution of the sterling area led to divergent interpretations of its 
utility and value. Keynes warned that the sterling area would be destroyed 
if Britain rejected currency convertibility, but opponents argued 
otherwise, and Boothby went further in arguing that London’s position as 
a financial centre would be threatened by currency convertibility.65 By 
1945, Attlee’s government, while indicating imperial preference was 
negotiable, nevertheless assured MPs that contracting preferences was 
contingent on compensation of US tariff reductions. Despite mutual 
professions of support for freer trade, the Americans suspected the British 
of wanting to maintain preferential tariffs, while the British were 
convinced the Americans wished to maintain high tariffs.66 Both Sir John 
Anderson and Churchill maintained that wartime agreements did not 
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compromise imperial preference, with Britain no more bound to remove 
preferences than the US was to reduce tariffs. However, while viewing 
the IMF as no threat to the sterling area, Anderson was concerned at the 
unprecedented use of the word “elimination” entering the international 
vocabulary. The new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, dismissed such 
sentiments, stating that the price of American aid was the elimination of 
the discriminatory preferences of Article VII “and we knew it.”67  
More positively, the government argued that without a multilateral 
agreement there could be a return to economic blocs, unstable currencies, 
and trade discrimination. Viscount Samuel (Liberal) praised the US for 
seeking to facilitate free trade while Keynes added that the US 
commitment to full employment indicated renunciation of high tariffs. 
Some members, such as the Labour MP Richard Stokes, doubted the 
legitimacy of the American conversion to free trade internationalism, for 
while the pressure to export to promote domestic employment might be 
greater, it would not be uncontested, for Congress and public opinion also 
influenced policymaking, and following post-war demobilization, 
protectionism would just as likely re-emerge as a solution to 
unemployment.68 
Those who favoured acceptance and abstention had different reasons for 
not rejecting the agreement. In the main, the former made a virtue of a 
necessity by placing, despite misgivings, the best possible construction on 
the deal. The acquiescence of the latter was underscored by general 
dissatisfaction with the terms. With a large Labour majority in the 
Commons, the Bill passed by 345 to 98 but 24 Labour MPs, including 
future leaders James Callaghan and Michael Foot voted against, and some 
Labour speakers saw Bretton Woods as sealing American economic 
hegemony and a surrender of economic sovereignty.69 There was also 
some politicking by Ministers. As Leader of the Commons, Herbert 
Morrison informed the Parliamentary Labour Party the government would 
not discipline any member opposing ratification and the loan. Dalton even 
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told Callaghan that he didn’t mind if some MPs voted against, as it would 
show the US that the Labour Government was not a pushover and had its 
own domestic problems and dissensions to deal with.70 
Despite a two-line whip instructing Conservative MPs to abstain, 47 MPs 
voted against Bretton Woods. The Conservative opposition included 
mavericks like Max Aitken but also “coming men” including Oliver 
Stanley and two future Chancellors, John Selwyn-Lloyd and Peter 
Thorneycroft. Boothby, a veteran Empire free-trader, typically viewed the 
agreement as compromising the sterling zone and imperial preference, 
central pillars of economic sovereignty, while caustically reminding 
abstaining Conservatives of the party’s imperial identity. Treading the 
line between accepting the need to approve new arrangements while 
deprecating the terms was difficult but Churchill tried his best. Weakly 
stating that Conservative votes “could not affect the position” he 
maintained that abstention reflected refusal to accept responsibility for the 
proposals.71  
Ultimately, possessing a large parliamentary majority, it was Labour party 
opinion that mattered. During the war-time political truce, there had been 
little in the way of partisan politics. MPs like Aneurin Bevan and Emanuel 
Shinwell had been critical of the wartime coalition but only once forced a 
division—on the Beveridge Report in February 1943, a vote closely 
associating Labour with social welfare reform.72 In relation to Bretton 
Woods, there were multi-faceted factors involved for Labour MPs, of 
ideology, party discipline and loyalty, national interest, and the blunt 
determination to reject any policy which might lead to a return to the 
economics of the 1930s. Indeed, the 1945 Labour Manifesto had 
described the inter-war years in dramatic terms:  
Great economic blizzards swept the world in those years. The great 
inter-war slumps were not acts of God or of blind forces. They were 
the sure and certain result of the concentration of too much economic 
power in the hands of too few men.73 
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While there was a tension in the Labour Party between Keynesian demand 
management and socialist planning, the 1945 Manifesto broke with the 
Coalition consensus, with an explicit commitment to strict economic 
controls, planning and a socialized sector of the economy. These concerns 
seem at odds with accepting international institutions aimed at regulating 
international commerce and capital. The IMF and World Bank were 
hardly socialist organisations, yet Labour Ministers, except (until 1945) 
Bevin, were strong supporters. Bevin’s eventual conversion was 
important, for his authority and popularity in the labour movement, 
especially in the trade unions, was considerable.74 That Dalton, Gaitskell, 
and others fell in with what has been termed an Atlanticist approach to the 
post-war world should occasion little surprise, for it was no longer 
theoretical speculation but practical realities and difficulties of the post-
war domestic economy which intruded.  
Labour’s course was a product of contradictions in previous thinking and 
the need to comply with Britain’s powerful wartime ally. As Keynes 
predicted, most sceptics acquiesced when faced with the alternative of 
“trying to survive the post-war transition without United States aid.”75 
Attlee and Dalton were ultimately pragmatists in recognizing that Britain 
badly needed the loan, and that Anglo-American co-operation was 
essential to post-war reconstruction—an acknowledgment of the harsh 
realities of the post-war world. The extent to which Britain should accept 
restrictions on her freedom in return for claiming a more satisfactory 
international environment continued to be a dilemma for the Attlee 
government in the post-war period.76 
It was never likely, despite the Conservative majority, that the House of 
Lords would reject the agreement though it was less of a foregone 
conclusion than the Commons vote. While deprecating the government’s 
handling of negotiations, Viscount Cranborne stated “it is not our job to 
make their task impossible.” That advice was heeded, for of 98 votes cast, 
only eight votes were against the agreement though there were many 
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abstentions. Two-thirds of those who spoke against the agreement, 
abstained, and of all who spoke most were against the arrangement, yet 
the predominantly silent majority prevailed.77 For those abstaining, the 
lack of a viable alternative explains their actions but behind the decision 
not to reject the Bill lay fears of a constitutional struggle with the 
Commons. Abstention attracted criticism as it was (correctly) suspected 
that it would allow the Conservatives to make political capital from later 
austerity and privations.78 
Conclusion 
 
The changing tone of the parliamentary debates reflected the changing 
relationship of the US and Britain based on their respective political and 
financial fortunes between 1943 and 1945. The debates reveal that by 
using the loan as a condition and forcing-device to secure agreement to 
Bretton Woods, there remained several unresolved substantive points on 
the design of the post-war system. Arguably most important was the 
consequence of introducing the asymmetric adjustment obligation on 
debtor countries, which was raised but not resolved. As a feature of the 
White Plan it was carried into the final agreement, and alone, contradicted 
the argument advanced by proponents of Bretton Woods, more so in 1944 
than 1945, that the new system protected national sovereignty, and that 
unlike the inter-war gold standard, domestic economies would not be 
compelled to respond to international developments. In the event of 
structural disequilibrium, national solutions were expected, such as 
changes in currency values or improvement in a country’s 
competitiveness but discretion in national policy would be limited to what 
other governments believed necessary to maintain fixed exchange-rates.79  
 
Secondly, flaws in the scarce currency clause, projected as the bulwark 
against asymmetric adjustment, were raised but not adequately debated, 
though in the event, the clause was never triggered. Thirdly, Britain was 
in no position to undertake a one-year transition to convertibility, a point 
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made forcefully in the debates and almost universally agreed, and fully 
demonstrated when the time arrived, with severe austerity, dollar scarcity, 
balance-of-payment difficulties, and ultimately devaluation.80 Fourthly, 
the waiver clause on interest payments on the loan was rightly criticized 
for setting the bar in the wrong place, though ultimately it proved difficult 
to adjust the repayment burdens of countries to domestic economic 
performance. 
 
The question posed at the beginning as to whether political deliberation 
on Bretton Woods in the British legislature recognized the main issues 
relating to limits on national discretion in macroeconomic policymaking 
against the operations of international financial institutions, can be 
answered affirmatively. There was broad awareness that past mistakes 
must not be repeated but while most parliamentarians were prepared to 
make a leap in the dark, idealists, optimists, and visionaries were very 
much a minority. Hard-headed pragmatism and cynicism held sway, and 
few concurred with Keynes that Bretton Woods represented an attempt 
“to implement the wisdom of Adam Smith.”81 Among economists 
however there was great admiration for Keynes’ contribution, for as 
Robbins recorded:  
 
I think he may well feel that with all the faults of the agreement which 
has emerged, something has been accomplished in the way of 
constructive internationalism which, despite the vagaries of 
Parliaments and Congresses, will not easily be brushed on one side.82  
 
Regardless of how the agreement was presented, the compelling nature of 
arguments for acceptance, of pressing financial necessity, and the need 
for international cooperation to promote stability and prosperity, reflected 
the divergent economic reality of the respective countries. Opposition to 
Bretton Woods and the loan was grounded on the fear of American 
economic dominance, with little hope or expectation that the US would 
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treat Britain favourably in the post-war world. An air of general 
disgruntlement characterized much debate, with regrets for a world now 
lost accompanied by fears for the future. Keynes was despondent that 
many politicians refused to accept clear evidence that Britain’s resources 
were not what they once were. 
 
While the urgency of securing an agreement was fully apparent, Britain’s 
subordinate position created difficulties. Members of all parties 
appreciated that the US could not be blamed for seeking to protect her 
own interests, though there was divergence over the justice of that stance, 
but the perceived harsh treatment meted out by a wartime ally cut deeply. 
Even if loss of economic sovereignty and termination of imperial 
preference did not immediately materialize, the blow to national and 
imperial prestige remained great. 
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